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BEYOND OBJECTS, BEYOND SUBJECTS: 
GIORGIO AGAMBEN ON ANIMALITY, 




AbstrAct: The work of Giorgio Agamben could perhaps best be described as an original 
extension of the onto-theological critique that has dominated much of the last century’s 
philosophical endeavors. For him, this fundamental critical perspective extends itself toward the 
deconstruction of traditional significations, including the boundaries said to exist between the 
human and the animal as well as between the human and the divine. By repeatedly unveiling 
these arbitrary divisions as being a result of the state of ‘original sin’ in which we dwell, Agamben 
aims to advance philosophical discourse ‘beyond representation’ and toward a ‘pure’ encounter 
with the myriad of faces always ever present before us. In this sense, he works toward redefining 
‘revelation’ as being little more than an exposure of our animality, something which indeed 
lies now unveiled at the real root of our being. This animality is in fact locateable beyond the 
separation of being into form and content, a division which is rather indebted to the onto-
theological representations that have governed the discourse of being. 
By focusing instead on the manner in which paradigms could be said to operate over and 
against the (sovereign) rule of representations, he articulates a movement from particularity to 
particularity that resists the temptation to universalize our language on being. In this sense, then, 
the analogical logic of the paradigm, expressed always through the absolutely singular, exposes 
the beings which we all are before another, rather than violently condense any given (‘whatever’) 
being into a formal representation. By thus determining the contours of the paradigmatic 
expression, this essay intends to unite several ‘loose’ strands of Agamben’s thought in order to 
demonstrate the consequence of this line of inquiry: that the end of representation, often criticized 
as a form of political nihilism, is the only way in which to develop a justifiable ethics, one beyond 
the traditional binary divisions of subject and object, or of universal and particular. In the end, 
as Agamben illustrates repeatedly, there is only the ‘thingness’ that each thing is, and which must 
be safeguarded in its precarity, thus paving the way (through a messianic intervention) for an 
ethical discourse to appear. 
It is a final gesture toward the messianic, then, toward a religiously-inflected terminology 
which hovers over his entire oeuvre, that will ultimately guide Agamben’s ‘political’ project 
back toward its canonical moment most clearly identifiable within the Christian heritage. As 
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his reading of Benjamin’s relationship to Saint Paul indicates, there is much to be discerned for 
him in the transition from Judaic law (with its representational logic) to Christian ‘forms of life’ 
(with its paradigmatic focus). Rather than be content with a simple re-affirmation of Christian 
claims, however, Agamben deftly maneuvers his own position toward one of exposing the logic 
of Christianity as that which reveals a deep investment in a pantheistic worldview, one which 
theology can no longer afford to ignore.
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INTRODUCTION
For Walter Benjamin, it was the act of remembrance, in contrast to the search for scien-
tific-historical fact, that guaranteed history could never be entirely ‘atheological’.1 There 
would always be some viewpoint external to history that would impart meaning to it. In 
this sense, the representations (‘semblances’) which seem to solidify any sense of ‘cultural 
intelligibility’ are given their meaning by viewpoints which must appear in some fashion 
to be theological, whether they are identified with a particular religious tradition or not.2 
They are also, as Benjamin made clear toward the very end of his life, undone by those 
‘weak messianic forces’ moving through history that run counter to all theological-ideo-
logical readings of history, all myths of progress.3 His co-opting of a religious (‘messianic’) 
terminology which seems to split or divide the theological from within can be established 
as a reading of history that attempts to grant power to those oppressed groups or persons 
who are otherwise muted within history, by any official historical record, that is, occluded 
by the strong narratives of progress and victory which dominate most historical accounts. 
Remembrance, by this count, will always thus appear to have two faces, that of the victor 
and that of the loser. This is more than a subtle reminder of the inherent contentiousness 
of any historiographical act.4 Indeed, acts of remembrance are often nationalistic, racist, 
colonialist or patriarchical. They are possibly also, however, stories of liberation, surviv-
     1. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA, 
Belknap, 1999, p. 471. Something of his lifelong ‘theological’ viewpoint can also be seen in something like 
his relation to scripture, for example, as witnessed in Brian Britt, Walter Benjamin and the Bible, New York, 
Continuum, 1996. Benjamin’s bringing of the theological into relation with the historical is also discussed 
at length in Stéphane Mosès, The Angel of  History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem, trans. Barbara Harshar, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009. See also, Susan A. Handelman, Fragments of  Redemption: Jewish 
Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1991 
and Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics of  the Profane: The Political Theology of  Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2003.
     2. Benjamin’s juxtaposition of historical ‘semblances’ or representations against his version of dialectical 
materialism, which focused rather on the singularities of history brought forward in ‘messianic time’ is testi-
fied to throughout The Arcades Project, see especially, his notes sketched toward the end of his life, gathered 
under the title ‘Materials for the Exposé of 1935’, no. 25, p. 918. 
     3. Cf. Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’ in Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, (eds.), 
Selected Writings, vol. 4, 4 vols., trans. Edmund Jephcott et al., Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 2003. 
     4. Cf. the development of this notion in relation to Benjamin’s conception of history in Matthias Fritsch, 
The Promise of  Memory: History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin, and Derrida, Albany, NY, State University of New 
York Press, 2005. 
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al, testimony and truth, functioning often as, to borrow the theologian Johann Baptist 
Metz’s phrase, ‘dangerous memories’ to those persons remaining in power.5 Insofar as all 
acts of remembrance are stories begging to be believed, they are certainly ideological, 
some more just in their fidelity to truth, others less so. Moreover, some are more violent 
to the precarious construction of identities today, some less so; for identities, no less than 
stories, are built upon these acts of remembrance passed along through time.6 
It is in such a light that I would consider taking up Judith Butler’s recent engagement 
with Benjamin’s work, and, more specifically, with the much discussed term ‘messianic’. 
Like Benjamin before her, Butler has striven to defend the excluded and marginalized 
figures of history whose very presence serves as a sort of messianic force undoing our 
normative cultural (and often legal) representations.7 Though her use of the term ‘mes-
sianic’ has been somewhat limited, there lingers in it a profound connection to what 
has been stated above concerning Benjamin’s use of it.8 Illustrated by the context of her 
work on gender and its ‘undoing’, there is a specific way in which she attempts to under-
mine the ‘practices of repetition that constitute identity’ which has a strong resonance 
with Benjamin’s approach to history.9 As she has cleverly depicted it, in terms of human 
identity, there is no copy of an original ontological form that simply waits to be (re)pro-
duced in the present, but only copies of copies, carefully crafted representations of the 
(gendered) human being which change over time inasmuch as they are disseminated 
among particular social groupings. Early on in her work, and as she explained in the 
context of creating ‘gender trouble’: ‘The subject is not determined by the rules through 
which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process 
of  repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the produc-
tion of substantializing effects’.10 Her conclusion, that our identities are performed rather 
than ‘natural’, thus draws its strength from these acts of repetition which are easily de-
constructed. This leads her to conclude that: ‘Ontology is, thus, not a foundation, but a 
normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political discourse 
as its necessary ground’.11 
     5. Cf. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. J. Mat-
thew Ashley, New York, Crossroad, 2007. This idea is developed further in relation to Metz’s theology in 
Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, Collegeville, MN, Liturgical Press, 2000.
     6. This is nothing less than the reality of the contentious (political) realm of representations which can be 
said to shape our sense of self (subjecthood). Cf. an account of self-narration, and as will be subsequently im-
plicit in what follows, Judith Butler, Giving an Account of  Oneself, New York, Fordham University Press, 2005.
     7. From the outset, Butler’s work has been aimed at ‘undoing’ the normative (gendered, racial) divisions 
within our world. See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of  Identity, 10th anniversary 
ed., London, Routledge, 1999; Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of  ‘Sex’, London, Routledge, 1993; 
Undoing Gender, London, Routledge, 2004.
     8. Cf. her stated interest in the ‘messianic’ which she puts forth in the ‘Afterward’ to Ellen T. Armour and 
Susan M. St. Ville, (eds.), Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler, New York, Columbia University Press, 
2006. She has subsequently developed this thematic more explicitly in her lecture on religion given at 
Utrecht University in January 2010.
     9. Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 188.
     10. Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 185.
     11. Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 189.
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Ontology, in Butler’s eyes, would seemingly be little more than a word utilized his-
torically to mask the ruses of any attempt to ‘ground’ a given social normativity through 
a particular (‘theological’ in Benjamin’s words) reading of history. The critique she uti-
lizes, then, can be seen in this light as one aligned against the western ontotheological 
project and opening, as Annika Thiem highlights, toward the ethical.12 And this is ul-
timately what unites her work, in a certain sense, with Benjamin’s conceptualizations 
of history and theology, a proximity which she herself has recently acknowledged by 
making reference to Benjamin’s use of ‘messianic time’ in order to formulate a ‘revolu-
tionary’ critique of state (representational) violence.13
In essence, the division of gender unveiled by Butler as creating an arbitrary binary 
representation is an ephemeral ontotheological line which says nothing about an alleged 
ontological essence of being-male or being-female (if there even were such states of 
being, which she of course claims there are not), but rather is constituted as a theologi-
cal (hegemonic) bid for power on behalf of those who most strictly establish and guard 
the boundaries.14 Her deconstructive act, then, because it deals with an ontotheological 
platform, and much like Derrida’s work before her, has something of a messianic struc-
ture to it; that is, it exposes the fault lines of any normative ontotheological claims from 
within, and is, in like manner, a challenge to the sovereign powers that be.15
Butler has subsequently brought this unmasking of binary representations to the 
threshold of formulating an ethics, though pulling up short of a fuller critique of the 
onto-theology which pervades so much of western representational logics.16 In what 
follows, however, I wish to demonstrate how the work of Giorgio Agamben actually 
takes up this fuller onto-theological critique yet in-line with Butler’s observations, and 
despite any differences between them, pursues this line of thought further in order to 
deconstruct the parallel dichotomous logics at work in the arbitrary divisions estab-
     12. Annika Thiem, Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility, New York, 
Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 9f. 
     13. Cf. her taking up of Benjamin’s Theses on history, his use of ‘messianic time’ and the messianic poten-
tial for the disruption of state power, in Judith Butler, Frames of  War: When Is Life Grievable?, London, Verso, 
2009, pp. 134-5. See also her related essay on Benjamin’s notion of violence entitled ‘Critique, Coercion, 
and Sacred Life in Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’’ in Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan, (eds.), Politi-
cal Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, New York, Fordham University Press, 2006, pp. 201-219.
     14. She later extends this arbitrary signification of gender to include the divisions of race which could be 
said to ‘found’ the intelligibility of society in some sense. See Judith Butler, ‘Changing the Subject’ in Sara 
Salih, (ed.), The Judith Butler Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 333-34.
     15. The concept of a ‘messianic without messianism’ runs as a theme throughout Derrida’s later work. 
In essence, Derrida sought to develop an open-ended conceptualization of time that cannot be foreclosed 
upon in history, thus distancing him from any concrete, historical messianism within any particular reli-
gious tradition. Cf. his Specters of  Marx: The State of  the Debt, the Work of  Mourning and the New International, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 74f. See also the elaboration of the concept in John D. 
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of  Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University 
Press, 1997.
     16. Though Butler has engaged more recently with some theological motifs, including Joseph Ratzinger’s 
(Pope Benedict XVI’s) views on homosexuality, she advocates within the same pages that religion is only 
one of many fields attempting to deal with the multiple historical tensions that constitute the subject under 
state rule. Butler, Frames of  War, pp. 117-121 and 149f. 
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lished between the human-animal and the human-divine.17 I will therefore argue that 
Agamben’s taking-up of this thematic follows quickly on the heels of Heidegger’s onto-
theological critique, though it perhaps also points toward, in a more Kantian register, 
the only possible grounds for the existence of theology—though perhaps a particular 
brand of Benjaminian theology at that.18 In this manner, I hope to show how Agamben 
begins to form a position of immanent materialism that is perhaps perceivable as a sort 
of pantheistic animality, an openness to the ‘thing-ness’ of all created things and the 
only way left toward approaching the divine once the messianic forces working within 
history have dismantled the ‘myth of division’ which any subsequent myth of progress 
founds itself upon.
ON HUMAN-ANIMAL REPRESENTATIONS
The work of the contemporary Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben could perhaps best be 
described as an outright extension of the onto-theological critique that has dominated 
much of the last century’s philosophical endeavors. For him, this fundamental critical 
perspective extends itself toward the deconstruction of traditional (normative) significa-
tions, including the boundaries said to exist between the human and the animal as well 
as between the human and the divine. By repeatedly unveiling these arbitrary divisions 
as themselves being a result of the state of ‘original sin’ in which we dwell (the state of sig-
nification itself), Agamben aims to advance philosophical discourse ‘beyond representa-
tion’ and toward a ‘pure’ encounter with the myriad of faces always ever present before 
us, in their sheer nudity as it were.19 In this sense, he works toward redefining ‘revela-
     17. On their differences, one could note, for example, how they differ on notions of sovereignty pre-exist-
ing the state of exception. See Elena Loizidou, Judith Butler: Ethics, Law, Politics, London, Routledge, 2007, 
p. 98f. Butler, for her part, has also sought to critique Agamben’s all-pervading conceptualizations of sov-
ereignty and ‘bare life’ in her discussion with Gayatri Spivak in Who Sings the Nation-State?, Oxford, Seagull, 
2007. Their positions in general, however, do converge on multiple interlocking points, and so, interestingly, 
Eric L. Santner seeks to combine Agamben’s fundamental insights on ‘bare life’ in relation to gender found 
in Butler’s work in his On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006.
     18. Agamben’s critique of ontotheology seems to take its cue most directly from Heidegger whose work 
seems to have charted a specific course for Agamben. On Heidegger’s use of the term ‘ontotheology’, see 
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vol. IV: Nihilism, David Farell Krell, (ed.), trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, 4 vols., San 
Francisco, HarperSanFrancisco, 1982, p. 209f. as well as Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology 
and the Politics of  Education, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. It should also be noted, however, 
that Agamben has consistently, though opaquely, insisted that the work of Benjamin played the role of ‘rem-
edy’ to the ‘poison’ in Heidegger’s writings, and thus, that the two must be read in conjunction throughout 
his own work. See Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction, Stanford, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2009, p. 310f.
     19. Cf. the numerous places where Agamben takes up his critique of signification, often in explicit refer-
ence to what he sees as Derrida’s commitment to it. See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and 
Phantasm in Western Culture, trans. Ronald L. Martinez, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 
1993, p. 156f; Infancy and History: On the Destruction of  Experience, trans. Liz Heron, London, Verso, 1993, p. 9; 
The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, Stanford, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2005, 102f. In essence, his critique attempts to demonstrate that the act of signification itself 
violently enters one into a world of representations that in fact mutes the singularity that each person is. In 
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tion’ as being nothing more than an exposure of language itself as it attempts to limit 
and contain our animality, something which indeed now lies unveiled at the real root of 
our being. What Agamben seems to be after, then, is a presentation of the post(because 
pre-)human.20 This ‘animality’ within us is in fact locateable beyond the separation of 
being into form and content, a division which is rather indebted to the onto-theological 
representations that have governed all discourse on our (human) being.
In his work on the human-animal divide entitled The Open, his most extensive treat-
ment of the subject thus far, Agamben goes to great lengths in order to illustrate how 
the construction of the human subject rests upon a platform of division and separation, 
one which has no substance in and of itself other than its ability to signify.21 Indeed, the 
space that is said to offer such a signification is decidedly empty, having no content per se, 
only bearing its position as a pure functionality of separating and dividing.22 This is the 
place for Agamben to locate the origin of language, as well as of our ‘original sin’. This 
site of language, being also the site of our sin, is produced through our (self)distancing 
from our animality, which also in effect produces the unique character that distinguishes 
humanity from its animality. This is the originary ground of the ontotheological par ex-
cellence.23 That is, the human subject, in order to appear as such, must constantly state 
its distinction from the other animals, even if such distinctions become more and more 
difficult, or even impossible, to make. The human being must remove him/herself from 
the animal world in order to be human, the original act of transcendence if ever there 
was one.
Utilizing his characteristic genealogical approach, and thus ranging in his sources 
from Aristotle and Heidegger to the founder of taxonomy Carolus Linnaeus and the bi-
ologist Jakob von Uexküll, Agamben continuously circulates around his target of the his-
torical fabrication of the human subject, performing an analysis which renders humans 
as being truly ‘without content’ in terms of any alleged ontological essence. They are 
precisely ‘without content’ in the sense that there is nothing inherent to their nature 
which can render them unique (or, sovereign) among the animal kingdom. Indeed, their 
borders are ‘mobile’, seemingly permeable, and thus in great need of defense, as often 
contrast to this, Agamben seeks on multiple occasions to contribute toward an ‘exposure’ of being before the 
face of another, something he describes as our more proper state of ‘nudity’. See Giorgio Agamben, Nudités, 
trad. Martin Rueff, Paris, Rivages, 2009.
     20. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language’ in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 39f.
     21. Agamben most directly addresses the animal/human boundary in his work The Open: Man and Animal, 
trans. Kevin Attell, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, which also, at times, deliberately directs the 
questioning of this arbitrary separation to the human/divine border as well. See also his remarks in Giorgio 
Agamben, Means without Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, Minneapolis, 
MN, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 93. 
     22. His remarks on the ‘state of exception’ elsewhere should be read in this context. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, 
State of  Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005.
     23. Cf. the notion of our ‘original sin’ being a state of separation from our animality is explored in Giorgio 
Agamben, Idea of  Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt, Albany, NY, State University of New 
York Press, 1995, p. 95f; The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt, Minneapolis, MN, University of Min-
nesota Press, 1993, p. 80.
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the weakest arguments are in need of the most powerful, emphatic and yet absolutely 
empty justifications, their force as it were. 
The ceaseless need to rearticulate the boundaries between human and animal, a 
boundary which cannot really be said to exist as such, is thereby exposed as the ‘an-
thropological machinery’ which institutes what we call ‘humanity’. It is a boundary de-
pendent upon humankind’s ability to construct its own image within a more originary 
zone of indifference, what he will elsewhere call a ‘zone of indistinguishability’ or a site 
of ‘pure potentiality’.24 It is here that the anthropological machine engages in a cease-
less ‘articulation between human and animal, man and non-man, speaking being and 
living being’.25 Humankind thus becomes sovereign within (‘over’) the animal kingdom 
because it alone can draw a distinction of some sort between human and animal, de-
spite the fact that no substantial or quantifiable distinction can really be established as 
such. This, indeed, is what his genealogical analysis seeks to uncover: the ‘division of life’ 
itself, forged in the cracks of the ‘human being’, without justification or even the poten-
tial for being clearly delineated as identifiable. It was this very lack of identifiability, in 
fact, which led taxonomists such as Linnaeus to attempt a categorization of humans as 
the animal which has the unique capacity to recognize itself as human, and so, therefore 
by this logic, must be human.26 Consequently, each statement that attempts to articulate 
our being proceeds from this fractured sense of self that lies deep within, a state that 
has historically yet been defined as sin. The uniqueness of Agamben’s claim here is that 
this is not simply an ontological proposition (hence, both biological and philosophical), 
but a theological one as well (hence, ‘sinful’), and thus it is truly onto-theological. On-
totheology is therefore defined as a reaction to the originary ‘zone of indistinction’, that 
is, to the ‘caesura’ at the heart of our being in which we constantly dwell and which we 
wish to transcend by positing ourselves as (sovereign) subjects. Ontotheology is given 
its reign, then, over the ambiguity of our condition as animals so that the human being 
might be born.
What becomes evident for Agamben in all of this is that a deeper ontological rift is 
opened up through this investigation into the boundary between animal and human, a 
rift which likewise threatens to engulf the entirety of the western rational and theologi-
cal project. As he summarizes the nature of the problematic: 
It is as if determining the border between human and animal were not just one 
question among many discussed by philosophers and theologians, scientists and 
politicians, but rather a fundamental metaphysico-political operation in which 
alone something like ‘man’ can be decided upon and produced. If animal life and 
human life could be superimposed perfectly, then neither man nor animal—and, 
perhaps, not even the divine—would any longer be thinkable.27 
     24. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 47f; State of  Exception, p. 31; The Open, pp. 37-8; Profanations, trans. Jeff 
Fort, New York, Zone, 2007, p. 79.
     25. Agamben, The Open, pp. 37-8.
     26. Cf. Agamben, The Open, p. 26.
     27. Agamben, The Open, p. 21.
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An entirely immanent reading of history is opened up through this reflection, one 
that likewise directly impinges upon what we have come to understand as being the 
domain of the ‘theological’. Hence, his reading of Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic force’ is 
essential to unmasking the rather arbitrary strength of signification.28 Only a messi-
anic dislodging of the boundaries between human and animal, as between human and 
divine, could point toward something like the arbitrariness of division itself. Much like 
Foucault’s famous ending to The Order of  Things where he declares that man is a recent 
invention, the invention of homo sapiens is, for Agamben, ‘neither a clearly defined spe-
cies nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of 
the human’, something which the messianic forces moving through history are capable 
of disrupting.29 This is so because, as Agamben will elsewhere state, the messianic is an 
entrance into that ‘zone of indifference’ where the human-animal and human-divine 
divisions are created, an entrance that also reveals the true nature of such a zone, as 
the contentless, unpronounceable potentiality that exists within all created things.30 It 
is the blank slate upon which so much of our significations are carved, that is, where 
the anthropological machinery continues to produce our self-identity.31 It is pre-historic 
inasmuch as it is pre-linguistic—a radical manner of ‘moving beyond’ (as ‘before’) the 
ontotheological indeed.
For this reason, he is able to take up the ‘messianic vocation’ elsewhere as a coun-
ter movement to these productions and a chance to return to our animality. Co-opt-
ing a religious terminology, though in some contrast to Derrida’s adaptation of the 
same concept, Agamben utilizes a discourse of the messianic as a suspension of all 
sovereign decisions regarding the construction of representations in general. Essen-
tially, the messianic forces moving through history, much as they were for Benjamin, 
are those ‘weak’ forces established as counter to the sovereign narratives of a ‘purer’ 
ideological script. If stripped to their barest form, it is possible to view these messianic 
forces, as Agamben does, as even capable of stripping down our sovereign notions of 
transcendence and ‘humanity’. The messianic is, by this count, ‘a movement of im-
manence, or, if one prefers, a zone of absolute indiscernability between this world and 
the future world’.32 It is a chance for a redemption which can be said to precede cre-
ation.33 The messianic issues in a ‘generic potentiality’, a ‘being-without-content’ as 
such which more accurately presents created things by not trying to identify or repre-
sent them.34 The messianic vocation is therefore also the ‘revocation of every vocation’ 
     28. Cf. Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 102f.
     29. Agamben, The Open, p. 26. Cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of  Things: An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences, 
New York, Vintage, 1970, pp. 386-7.
     30. Agamben, The Time That Remains, 26f.
     31. Agamben himself deploys the image of the ‘blank slate’ as a metaphor for our ‘pure potentiality’ in a 
short tale on the philosopher Damascius in Idea of  Prose, pp. 31-4. For an elaboration upon this theme, see 
also Anthony Downey, ‘Zones of Indistinction: Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Bare Life’ and the Politics of Aesthetics’ 
Third Text, vol. 23, no. 2, 2009, pp. 109-25.
     32. Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 25.
     33. Such is what Agamben has recently claimed in his essay ‘Création et salut’ in Nudités, pp. 9-22.
     34. Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 26.
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and a dwelling in the indiscernability of our situatedness which is ultimately all we 
have.35 It is also, however, the only viable ethical option which is present to humanity, 
if humanity is willing to embrace this ‘coming political task’ which risks the very defi-
nition of humanity. As he puts it, 
To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will 
therefore mean no longer to seek new—more effective or more authentic—
articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within 
man—separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the 
suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man.36 
Though critics such as Dominick LaCapra have been concerned about the nature of his 
making this a political task for future generations, the messianic act of dividing (signi-
fied) divisions themselves, something which Agamben discerns at work in the writings of 
both Saint Paul and Benjamin, is an entrance into the zone of indistinction that yet must 
not be foreclosed upon with the ease of perpetuating violent representations; rather, it 
must be kept open and allowed to expose itself for what it is beyond the political sphere 
entirely.37 Instead of being an opening to a truly political nightmare, as LaCapra envi-
sions, it is, in this fashion, rather an end to the political as we know it, something which 
has certainly earned him (and perhaps rightly) the label of being a ‘political nihilist’ at 
times.38 Despite this seemingly harsh criticism, for Agamben it is only at the point of dis-
solving politics that the only true ethical task may be carried out, as a ceasing entirely of 
our indebtedness to the ‘anthropological machine’. If there is an ontology at work here, 
it is to be found in this movement of openness, a certain regression beyond representa-
tion and politics, a poverty of being that (in Heideggerian terms) shares with the animal’s 
poverty of world.39 It is a willingness to enter into a poverty of being that the messianic 
     35. Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 23, de-emphasized from the original. This messianic vigor, then, 
seems to condense what he has stated elsewhere as a Deleuzian-Spinozistic reduction of philosophical in-
vestigation to a plane of ‘absolute immanence’. As he considers it, ‘Theōria and the contemplative life, which 
the philosophical tradition has identified as its highest goals for centuries, will have to be dislocated onto a 
new plane of immanence. It is not certain that, in the process, political philosophy and epistemology will 
be able to maintain their present physiognomy and difference with respect to ontology. Today, blessed life 
lies on the same terrain as the biological body of the West’. Giorgio Agamben, ‘Absolute Immanence’ in 
Potentialities, p. 239.
     36. Agamben, The Open, p. 92. See also, Andrew Benjamin, ‘Particularity and Exceptions: On Jews and 
Animals’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 107, no. 1, 2008, pp. 71-87.
     37. Cf. Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 138f. LaCapra’s critique, in this regard, seems to misperceive 
Agamben’s stated intentions of ‘going beyond’ the political, which precludes any foray into dangerous, uto-
pian political movements. Just how this form of living without politics is achievable, however, remains to be 
seen. See Dominick LaCapra, History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University 
Press, 2009, p. 162f. 
     38. Cf. Ernesto Laclau, ‘Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?’ and William Rasch, ‘From Sovereign Ban 
to Banning Sovereignty’ both found in Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli, (eds.), Giorgio Agamben: 
Sovereignty & Life, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 22 and 107 respectively. Catherine Mills 
also draws attention to the viability of his end to politics in the conclusion to her The Philosophy of  Agamben, 
Stocksfield, Acumen, 2008.
     39. Cf. Agamben, The Open, p. 49f. See also, the idea of ‘regression’ explored by Agamben in his essay 
‘Philosophical Archaeology’, in The Signature of  All Things: On Method, trans. Luca D’Isanto with Kevin Attell, 
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points toward, what has elsewhere been suggested as resembling a certain ‘Franciscan’ 
ontology in his work.40
IMMANENCE, OR MATERIALISM AS A PANTHEISTIC ANIMALITY
In contrast to the traditional transcendent claims of ontotheological speculation, 
Agamben’s work seems poised to present what Antonio Negri has referred to as a ‘re-
newal of the theological-political in the Spinozian way’, what could otherwise perhaps 
be labeled as a ‘theology of immanence’ potentially latent within his writings. This is 
something which seemingly does point in many ways to a potential ‘re-enchantment’ 
of our post-religious world.41 Agamben’s understanding of immanence is therefore, 
and as might be anticipated from what has already been stated above, wrapped within 
his conception of a zone of indifference, indistinction and exception, a zone seem-
ingly forever marked by the repeated attempts to transcend its ambiguity and to posit 
an ontotheological grounding through its various act of signification. The divisions of 
gender, of race, of human and animal, as well as of human and divine are all scored 
within this zone, and, as he makes clear, it is a zone of suspension which should, as the 
present ethical task before us, be itself constantly suspended until it remains as only 
the pure potentiality that it most truly is, and without any identification to distort it.42 
It is a realm then ‘beyond representation’, a presentation of the particularity that all 
things irreducibly are. As Agamben’s later work on paradigms demonstrates, the way 
to reconcile the caesura or scission or fracture at the heart of the human being (our 
‘sinful’ state) is to do away with the dichotomous logics that this (representational) 
schema has brought us. Instead therefore of relying upon the false duality of the uni-
New York, Zone, 2009, p. 81f. LaCapra criticizes Agamben’s linkage of the animal with the ‘Muselmann’ of 
the concentration camps, which seems to him to collapse the diversity of animality onto a blanket scheme 
of ‘bare life’. He therefore charges Agamben with lacking the nuance necessary to deal with animality in its 
various species. Though there would seem to be truth to this statement, it should also be noted that Agam-
ben’s primary target here is really the machinery which produces the monolithic division between human 
and animal which Agamben is quick to criticize himself. Whether or not Agamben fails to take up the ‘di-
versity’ of animality itself remains, then, in some sense as an almost separate issue. For a similar critique of 
Agamben’s alleged ‘anthropocentric’ claims, see also Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of  the Animal 
from Heidegger to Derrida, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, p. 79f.
     40. As Lorenzo Chiesa has put it, ‘…the heroic homo sacer of politics is silently turned into the homo mes-
sianicus of Christian religion. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, Agamben’s notion of ‘weak’ 
[faible] being, a being characterized by a ‘presentative poverty’, could qualify his ontology as ‘Franciscan’’. 
Lorenzo Chiesa, ‘Giorgio Agamben’s Franciscan Ontology’ in Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano, (eds.), 
The Italian Difference: Between Nihilism and Biopolitics, Melbourne, re.press, 2009, p. 162. Alain Badiou has also 
referred to Agamben’s work as being ‘Franciscan’ in its ontology in his Logiques des Mondes: L’Être et l’événement, 
2, Paris, Seuil, 2006, p. 584. 
     41. Antonio Negri, ‘Sovereignty: That Divine Ministry of the Affairs of Earthly Life’, Journal for Cultural and 
Religious Theory, trans. Gabriele Fadini with Robert Valgenti, vol. 9, no.1, 2008, p. 100. LaCapra, for one, 
has termed Agamben’s ‘utopian’ project one that attempts to ‘re-enchantment’ our world. LaCapra, History 
and Its Limits, 167. 
     42. Cf. how all of these themes are brought together and interwoven throughout the short text Means 
Without Ends. 
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versal/particular (or of form/content, or lawfulness/exemplarity), we should learn to 
respect the absolute singularities that present themselves before us.43 
By focusing instead on the manner in which paradigms could be said to operate 
over and against the (sovereign) rule of representations, he articulates a movement from 
particularity to particularity that resists the temptation to universalize our language on 
being, indeed to be pre-linguistic as it were.44 In this sense, the analogical logic of the 
paradigm, expressed always through an absolute singularity, exposes the beings (what 
Agamben calls ‘forms of life’) which we all are before another, rather than violently con-
dense any given (or ‘whatever’) being into a pre-scripted representation.45 By thus de-
termining the contours of the paradigmatic expression as the end of representation, and 
which is thus often criticized as a form of political nihilism, Agamben seeks to discern 
the only way in which to develop a justifiable ethics, one beyond the traditional binary 
division of subject and object. In the end, as Agamben illustrates repeatedly, there is 
only the ‘thingness’ that each thing is, and which must be safeguarded in its precarity 
through a messianic revocation of all representative identifications.
It is an almost Levinasian sounding proposition that therefore appears to us, as an 
ethics of the face is established as the only ontological determination truly available to 
us, a presentation of the animality that we are.46 If humanity allows itself to venture here, 
into the pure realm of things beyond representation, then it may be capable of embrac-
ing its true vocation beyond vocation, the culmination of the messianic forces working 
through and throughout history. It would provide, then, a purely immanent dwelling 
inasmuch as it would also seek to eradicate the traditionally theological—hence, to pro-
fane our world of its ontotheological claims, which he seeks to express in his conceptual-
ization of the ‘coming task’ of profanation. There is no doubt that a profound rereading 
of humanity is at work here, from its smallest philosophical distinctions to its greatest 
religious aspirations.
Revelation, by this score, is reworked until it is little more than the attempt to articu-
late what cannot be articulated through language, which is, for Agamben, the inexpress-
ible fact of language’s existence.47 We dwell in language as we dwell in our world and it 
was our ability to uniquely posit ourselves in and through language that set us apart from 
the ‘animals’. Yet, how language is, that it is, is something we are barred from expressing 
in language. Accordingly, as he will join to our sense of being-in-the-world, ‘How the 
world is—this is outside the world’.48 It is, again, the external theological which grants it 
     43. Cf. the central thesis in Giorgio Agamben, ‘What is a Paradigm?’ in The Signature of  All Things, p. 20.
     44. This ‘pre-linguistic’ stage is what, initially, gave rise to his use of the term ‘infancy’ as the state toward 
which our regression should be directed. See Agamben, Infancy and History as well as the essay on regression, 
‘Philosophical Archaeology’, pp. 81-111. Cf. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, p. 90f.
     45. Cf. his characterization of ‘whatever being’ in The Coming Community, p. 1f., as well as his brief com-
ments on ‘forms of life’ in Means Without Ends, p. 3f. It should also be noted that the much anticipated fourth 
volume of his Homo Sacer project will be devoted to developing the notion of a ‘form of life’ in greater detail.
     46. Agamben, Means Without Ends, p. 91f. On Levinas’ ethics, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: 
An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburg, PA, Duquesne University Press, 1969.
     47. Agamben, Potentialities, p. 39f.
     48. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 106. 
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meaning, and which Agamben here seeks to bring to its conclusion—its profanation as 
it were. Transcendence, as the term which was historically used to attempt to describe 
this purely immanent fact of our existence, something which we could otherwise not 
express, can now be exposed as the pre-eminent concept that became the cornerstone 
for positing the various theories of sovereignty, both politically and theologically, and 
which are seemingly in decline today.49 Both of these varied and analogous attempts to 
concretely embody transcendence failed to perceive its true nature as merely being an 
attempt to exit our immanent state of animality. 
Hence, in the context of a series of condensed political aphorisms, Agamben is 
given over to state that the transcendent ‘is not a supreme entity above all things; 
rather, the pure transcendent is the taking-place of  every thing’.50 That a realm of things could 
exist, that it could dwell at all in a space of potential indistinction, this is the princi-
ple of transcendence toward which theology, in its explorations and justifications for 
God’s existence, and the Good which is likewise to be found there, has tried to point. 
As he renders it, 
God or the good or the place does not take place, but is the taking-place of the 
entities, their innermost exteriority. The being-worm of the worm, the being-stone 
of the stone, is divine. That the world is, that something can appear and have a 
face, that there is exteriority and non-latency as the determination and the limit 
of every thing: this is the good. Thus, precisely its being irreparably in the world 
is what transcends and exposes every worldly entity….the good is not somewhere 
else; it is simply the point at which they grasp the taking-place proper to them, at 
which they touch their own non-transcendent matter.51
Hence, inverting the crafted historical conceptions of theology, Agamben is able to de-
clare that salvation, as he will define it, is a purely profane interest, ‘the coming of the 
place to itself ’.52 Religion therefore becomes a ‘content-less’ project in light of this fun-
damental disclosure, without doctrine, without dogma, without need of oscillating be-
tween the transcendent and the immanent as between the universal and the particular.53 
What had been presumed to be transcendent is now rendered inoperative and a dynam-
ic immanence is revealed to be already at work within the profane order. 
Revelation does not mean revelation of the sacredness of the world, but only 
revelation of its irreparably profane character. (The name always and only names 
things.) Revelation consigns the world to profanation and thingness—and isn’t this 
precisely what has happened? The possibility of salvation begins only at this point; 
it is the salvation of the profanity of the world, of its being-thus.54
     49. Though Agamben has chosen to focus his remarks upon the decline of the oath in both religious and 
legal settings, the associated sense of transcendence that accompanies the oath seems to be included in this 
eclipse. See his Le sacrament du langage: Archéologie du serment, trad. Joël Gayraud, Paris, Vrin, 2009.
     50. Agamben, The Coming Community, pp. 14-5, emphasis in the original.
     51. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 15.
     52. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 15. Cf. also Agamben, Profanations, p. 73f.
     53. Cf. Agamben, The Time That Remains, pp. 136-7.
     54. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 90.
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The ‘whatever’ nature of things, the very thing-ness of all things, becomes seen as 
the created matter which is only redeemable through an encounter with the messianic 
disruption of representations formed within this ‘zone of indiscernability’ that is the lo-
cation only of our pure potentiality for being which we need not actualize in any sense. 
Only a pure potentiality, then, could be said to safeguard a thing’s thing-ness, refusing 
to attach a more or less violent representation (its ‘actuality’) of any sort to its existence, 
any onto-theological marker. In essence, we are led then to a theory of thingness which 
exalts the presentation (‘exposure’) of our animality before an other who is to be wit-
nessed bereft of all representations, in our nudity.55 If the divine could be said to exist 
over and beyond the ceaselessly articulated division between human and divine, then it 
would presumably only be demonstrable insofar as it is encounter-able in the face of the 
other. Perhaps, then, a purely immanent ontology is possible, but it is a realm wherein, 
if we are capable of dwelling in it, is inexpressible because without inherent (theological) 
meaning. It cannot be universalized or communicated as such; it can only be respected 
in its absolute singularity. It is, again, a site of pure potentiality that is as blank as the 
tablets upon which we would place our words.
A total (‘pure’) immanence subsequently arises within the profane order that cannot 
be surpassed by any notion of transcendence or its commonly associated sacrality. It 
dissolves the traditional (onto)theological and offers an unmediated opportunity to en-
counter the O/other before us. If we are to encounter the divine, then, it would only 
be through such an opening to this world beyond representations. And for this reason, 
This is why those who try to make the world and life sacred again are just as impious 
as those who despair about its profanation. This is why Protestant theology, which 
clearly separates the profane world from the divine, is both wrong and right: right 
because the world has been consigned irrevocably by revelation (by language) 
to the profane sphere; wrong because it will be saved precisely insofar as it is 
profane.56
There is only the profane order, just as there is only a movement from particular-
ity to particularity, collapsing the dichotomies of western logic with the same basic 
premises. There is only the profane, or the immanent, and this is the only place where 
anything like the divine is encounterable. This is what will allow Agamben, in an 
otherwise rather enigmatic section of his work The Coming Community, to declare that: 
‘The world—insofar as it is absolutely, irreparably profane—is God’.57 And this would 
appear to be the real revelation that Agamben has been working toward all along, a 
sort of pantheistic animality that is beyond the transcendence historically utilized to 
establish the ‘human being’ or the subject with which western thought is all-too-famil-
iar. What he is seeking to develop then is really just a letting of the thingness of each 
thing be, a task that pushes toward establishing a ‘theology of immanence’ in his work. 
The moment we fully embrace this realm beyond all representation, the moment we 
     55. Cf. Agamben, Nudités, p. 95f.
     56. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 90.
     57. Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 90. 
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dissolve transcendence and therefore immanence as well, is the moment we embrace 
a materialism beyond the animal-human or human-divine dichotomies, a materialism 
that can only as such be divine.
CONCLUSION
It is Agamben’s final gesture toward the messianic, and likewise toward a religiously-
inflected terminology which hovers over his entire oeuvre, that will ultimately guide his 
political project back toward its canonical moment, one most clearly identifiable within 
the Christian heritage. As his reading of Benjamin’s relationship to Saint Paul indicates, 
there is much to be discerned in the transition from Judaic thought (with its represen-
tational logic) to Christianity (with its paradigmatic focus), as Agamben seems to read 
it.58 Rather than be content with a simple re-affirmation of Christian claims, however, 
Agamben deftly maneuvers his own position toward one of exposing the logic of Chris-
tianity as that which reveals a deep investment in some form of a pantheistic worldview, 
one which theology can no longer afford to ignore.
Theology has been portrayed by Agamben throughout as an historical attempt to 
articulate a boundary between God and humanity, to produce an onto-theology that, 
under his gaze, seems now rather only to indicate the artificiality of the boundary itself, 
the fact that there really is no boundary ontologically existent as such. Though it has 
historically fallen to the various human disciplines of thought (biology, politics, theol-
ogy, etc) to manufacture representations which appear to draw a more or less absolute 
distinction, according to Agamben, that time has come to an end. This is not, as he will 
repeatedly state elsewhere, an attempt to secularize our world, but rather an effort of 
profanation, a returning of things once deemed sacred to their more proper use among 
human-beings.59 And though his project is certainly aimed toward dissolving the west-
ern onto-theological project, there is yet another veil to be removed, one that reveals the 
deeply Christian core within his work: the veil that tore from top to bottom exposing the 
presence thought to dwell in the holiest of holies—an originary act of profanation upon 
which Agamben’s work is seemingly founded and that has come to define the Christian 
legacy.60 And, in the end, perhaps without its onto-theological presuppositions, maybe 
theology could be, or even already is, closer to embracing certain forms of pantheistic 
materiality than even it would at times like to admit.61 
     58. If Agamben’s understanding of signification in light of Pauline theology is read in conjunction with 
his use of monastic life as an exemplary ‘form of life’, what we come across is a particularly ‘Christianized’ 
philosophy which Agamben seems to endorse, though being cautious to directly endorse such an under-
standing. See his The Time That Remains as well as his essay ‘What Is a Paradigm?’ in The Signature of  All 
Things, p. 9f.
     59. Cf. Agamben, Profanations, p. 77. 
     60. Cf. Mark 15:38.
     61. Though the scope of the essay does not here permit a fuller examination of theology’s possible inter-
ests in exploring a ‘theology of immanence’, suffice it to say that various feminist theologians, as only one 
example among many, have often championed this theme in their writings, including Mary Daly’s early 
challenges in Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of  Women’s Liberation, Boston, Beacon, 1973, Grace 
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